2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

7-22-2016

Brenda Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"Brenda Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 704.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/704

This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-4002
_____________
BRENDA ANN SCHWARTZ;
PAUL GRANT SCHWARTZ,
Appellants
v.
ACCURATUS CORPORATION,
In Its Own Right And As Successor In Interest to
Accuratus Ceramic Corporation;
MATERION BRUSH INC.,
C/O CT Corporation System
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 12-cv-6189)
District Judge: Hon. Jeffrey L. Schmehl
_______________
Argued
April 22, 2015
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 22, 2016)

Ruben Honik, Esq. (Argued)
Golomb & Honik
1515 Market Street
Suite 1100
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attorney for Appellants

A. Wesley Bridges, Esq.
Joseph G. Harraka, Jr., Esq. (Argued)
Becker Meisel
220 Lake Drive East
Woodland Falls Corporate Center, Suite 102
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Attorneys for Appellee
_______________
OPINION
_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
On June 22, 2015, a panel of this Court submitted a Petition for Certification of
Question of State Law to the New Jersey Supreme Court, asking that Court to accept for
certification the following question of law: “Does the premises liability rule set forth in
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006), extend beyond providing a duty
of care to the spouse of a person exposed to toxic substances on the landowner’s
premises, and, if so, what are the limits on that liability rule and the associated scope of
duty?” On July 30, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court graciously agreed to consider
the certified question, and, on July 6, 2016, rendered its unanimous decision. See
Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 2016 WL 3606026, -- A.3d -- (N.J. July 6, 2016).
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, among other things, that
“Olivo does not suggest that the duty recognized must remain static for all future cases …
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and that take-home toxic-tort liability must remain limited to a spouse handling takehome toxins.” (Slip Op. at 14 (original emphasis).) The Court further recognized that
“Olivo does not state, explicitly or implicitly, that a duty of care for take-home toxic-tort
liability cannot extend beyond a spouse. Nor does it base liability on some definition of
‘household’ member, or even on the basis of biological or familial relationships.” (Id. at
15 (original emphasis).) The Court emphasized that “a duty was found to exist in Olivo
based on the foreseeability of regular and close contact with the contaminated material
(the dangerous condition) over an extended period of time,” and not based only upon
one’s role as a spouse or family member. (Id. at 11.) In that Court’s view, the scope of
any duty of care in take-home toxic-tort liability cases instead turns on “a refined analysis
for particularized risk, foreseeability, and fairness,” staying cognizant of the “paramount
importance of foreseeability.” (Id. at 16.)
Because “[t]ort law is built on case-by-case development based on the facts
presented by individual cases,” (id. at 13), and “because of the idiosyncratic nature of
most … interactions with a take-home toxin,” (id. at 15), the Court held that it could not
“define the contours of the duty owed to others in a take-home toxic-tort action through a
certified question of law,” (id. at 16). Instead, it set forth “[c]ertain factors [that] will be
important as such cases present themselves.” (Id. at 17.) Those include (1) “the
relationship of the parties,” including “an assessment not only of the relationship between
a defendant’s employee and the person who is exposed to the take-home toxin, but also
the relationship between the defendant itself and the injured person”; (2) “the opportunity
for exposure to the dangerous substance and the nature of the exposure that causes the
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risk of injury”; and (3) “the employer’s knowledge of the dangerousness of exposure,
assessed at the time when the exposure to the individual occurred and not later, when
greater information may become available.” (Id.) The Court also noted that, “[i]n a nonstrict-liability negligence action, the dangerousness of the toxin, how it causes injury, and
the reasonable precautions to protect against a particular toxin are relevant in identifying
a foreseeable duty by a landowner for off-premises exposure of dangerous toxins.” (Id. at
17-18.)
The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it could not “create an abstract
bright-line rule ... as to ‘who’s in and who’s out’ on a negligence-based take-home toxictort cause of action based on Olivo or any previous decision[,]” and thus it held that its
response to our question would “have to be limited to clarifying that the duty of care
recognized in Olivo may extend, in appropriate circumstances, to a plaintiff who is not a
spouse.” (Id. at 18.) It further instructed that the assessment of whether the duty should
extend in any particular case “should take into account a weighing of the factors” it had
identified, “to determine whether the foreseeability, fairness, and predictability concerns”
that were earlier described in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110 (N.J.
1993), “should lead to the conclusion that a duty of care should be recognized under
common law.” (Slip Op. at 18.)
Given that helpful direction, we will vacate in part the decision of the District
Court (as to the issue appealed) and will remand this matter to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the opinion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in response to our Petition for Certification.
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